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Comparative prices and transition: the EU-accession countries
in international perspective
Abstract
Recent panel studies have found relatively high estimates for the elasticity of real ex-
change rates with respect to productivity measures in transition economies within Bal-
assa-Samuelson frameworks. This contrasts with other findings reporting cross-section
price-income elasticity estimates to depend positively on average income in the sample.
This paper aims to reconcile both results by putting real exchange rate developments of
transition economies in an international perspective. We illustrate the special status of
these economies in a simple world-wide Balassa-Samuelson-type price-income bench-
mark relationship between a real exchange rate measure (Penn World Table comparative
prices, i.e., exchange rate gaps) and PPP-adjusted per capita income. A pronounced un-
dervaluation at the start of transition, followed by a strong appreciation results in nor-
malisation towards the benchmark for Central and East European economies (CEEC)
but not for the CIS. We then make an attempt at extending the simple price-income re-
lationship to incorporate other real factors as well as reforms related to price deregulation.
Our results imply that, when accounting for demand shifts, external liberalisation, and espe-
cially for reform effort, the price-income-elasticity for CEEC economies was not differ-
ent from that of non-transition economies during the nineties.
JEL-Classification: F40, F43
Keywords: Balassa-Samuelson, transition
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1 Introduction
Recent panel data studies (e.g., Dobrinsky, 2003; de Broeck and Sløk, 2006) have found
comparatively high estimates for the elasticity of real exchange rates with respect to
productivity measures for transition economies, especially in Central and Eastern
Europe (CEEC), within Balassa-Samuelson frameworks. While this feature is usually
explained by extraordinary reform efforts in these countries spurring productivity
growth, it seems to contrast with other findings reporting that price-income elasticity
estimates from cross-section regression analyses vary greatly depending on sample
composition, where the inclusion of poor countries tends to generate lower elasticities
(Maeso-Fernandez et al., 2005).
The idea of the paper is to investigate both features by putting the real exchange rate
behaviour of transition economies into an international perspective. For this purpose, we
first motivate and introduce a simple international benchmark relationship between
comparative prices and per capita income, based on the Balassa-Samuelson effect (sec-
tions 2 and 3). Section 4 illustrates the special status of transition economies in the
cross-section version of this relationship: a pronounced undervaluation at the start of
transition is followed by a transition-specific pattern of strong appreciation during the
nineties, and results in some sort of  “normalisation” for Central and East European
economies (CEEC) but not for the CIS, i.e., at the beginning of the decade, CEEC
economies were not part of the international price-income benchmark relationship,
while by the end of the decade they were. To study what moved them there we make an
attempt in section 5 to extend the simple price-income relationship to incorporate de-
mand shifts, liberalisation, and especially reform efforts related to price deregulation.
Results of estimating the extended approach with panel data both in levels and in yearly
changes imply that, when accounting for demand shifts, external liberalisation, and es-
pecially for price deregulation effort, the price-income-elasticity for CEEC economies is
not different from that of non-transition economies.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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2 A review of Balassa-Samuelson
2.1 Purchasing power parity and deviations
Purchasing power parity is linked to the tradability of goods and services. Arbitrage en-
sures that the price of an internationally traded good be the same everywhere in the
world when   expressed in a common currency at the going exchange rate. If all goods
are tradable (T) – and enter each country’s basket used to construct the aggregate price
level with the same weight – aggregate price levels, 
T
j P ,  are identical for each pair of
countries if  expressed in a common currency at the going exchange rate,
T T P e P 2 12 1 = ,( 1 )
where country indices are 1 and 2, and e12 is the going nominal exchange rate, which
will express purchasing power parity (PPP): one unit of home currency buys the same
basket of goods at home as the equivalent amount of foreign currency. Defining the de-
viation of the ratio of two countries’  aggregate price levels from their nominal ex-











T .( 2 )
Transactions costs may imply a violation of PPP. In addition, different countries tend
to produce goods that are similar rather than perfectly substitutable, and the weights
attached to similar goods in aggregate price indices may differ across countries. But
most importantly, not all goods are traded. PPP may still hold for tradables but not for
non-tradables, e.g. for many services. Consequently, even with identical baskets used to
construct the aggregate price level with the same weights across countries, in the pres-
ence of non-tradables the nominal current market exchange rate cannot be expected to
express PPP.
In fact, as noticed about forty years ago by Balassa and Samuelson,
1 what one ob-
serves empirically is not just a deviation, but a systematic deviation of current exchange
rates from PPP levels: at the going exchange rate – even if expressing PPP for tradables
– non-tradables prices and thus aggregate price levels are higher in richer than in poorer
economies. Both Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964 and again 1994) rationalised this
pattern in a chain of arguments building on (a): purchasing power holds for tradables,
(b): relative prices reflect relative labour productivities, (c): national labour markets are
homogenous across sectors of production, and (d): the biggest differences in (labour)
productivity across countries are in tradable rather than non-tradable production. Leav-
                                                
1 As noted in Bergin et al. (2004), this observation can be traced back to Ricardo and from there, via
Taussig, Ohlin, Viner, Harrod, and Rothschild, to Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964).Balassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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ing (d) aside leaves the productivity gap version of the Balassa-Samuelson-hypothesis
(BS): for each pair of countries, country 2’s real exchange rate is higher than that of
country 1 if country 2’s productivity in the tradables sector, relative to the non-tradables
sector, is higher than in country 1.
The simplest productivity gap version of the BS-hypothesis is stated within a frame-
work of two countries, two homogenous goods (one tradable, one non-tradable), and one





















RER ,    (3)
where Pj is the national price level when not all goods are tradable.
T
j A  and 
N
j A  are (la-
bour) productivity in country j’s tradable and non-tradable sectors, and equal prefer-
ences across countries are described by constant and equal consumption expenditure
shares for tradables and non-tradables,and 1–, respectively. Adding step (d), i.e., that
cross-country productivity differences occur only in the tradable goods sector immedi-




















RER ,( 4 )
with yj as per capita income. Specifically, the consumption expenditure share for non-
tradables, 1–, corresponds to the elasticity of the real exchange rate with respect to
relative per capita income, which we will in this paper refer to as the price-income elas-
ticity within the BS-framework.
There is considerable opposition to both the theoretical validity and the empirical
content of steps (a) – (d): as a most obvious point of criticism, it is challenging to de-
termine whether or not a particular product is tradable (Parsley and Wei, 2004; Stein,
2005). Equally fundamental, even slight deviations from the simplifying assumptions of
the two-countries-two-goods-one-factor set-up illustrate the knife-edge role of these
assumptions for the resulting systematic relationship between prices and productivities
(Podkaminer, 2003).
More specifically on the evidence for and against (a) – (d), the idea that purchasing
power parity holds for tradables must certainly be restricted to take account of the exis-
tence of quality differences. In addition, while the notion that relative prices reflect rela-
tive productivities is in general little contested, Strauss (1997) does not find support for
the assumption of wage equalisation across traded and nontraded sectors, at least not for
the short and medium term, defined as up to four years, in fourteen OECD countries
under consideration. I.e., at least in the short and medium term, wage differentials may
have an impact on the real exchange rate.
                                                
2 For a simple derivation see, e.g., Frensch (2005).￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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For the U.S., Slifman and Corrado (1996) concluded that “the published figures for
business and manufacturing labor productivity suggest that since the beginning of the
1990s output per hour in the nonmanufacturing sector of the economy has been disap-
pointing” (p. 1). Gullickson (1992) enhance this finding by observing that “all of the
growth in private business multifactor productivity in the US during the 1980s could be
attributed to manufacturing.” But most importantly, based on the 1996 benchmark study
of the Penn World Tables, Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2005) find “that, indeed, the
cross-country TFP differences  are by far larger in the tradable than in the nontradable
sectors. Moreover, since this translates into differences in labor productivities, our evi-
dence suggests that Balassa and Samuelson were right!” (pp. 18f).
Summing up, while there is considerable opposition to both the original BS-
hypothesis and its productivity gap version, the criticism holds equally for both versions
of the proposition. Thus, step (d) constitutes perhaps the least contested element of the
BS-proposition: the biggest differences in (labour) productivity across countries are in-
deed in tradable rather than non-tradable production. On might therefore argue that
testing either the original BS-hypothesis or its productivity gap version is by and large
equivalent: if the one holds (or not), so does the other. In this paper, we will stick to the
original BS-hypothesis, assuming that results hold for the productivity gap version as
well.
2.2 The empirical BS-literature
The literature tests for two basic questions: is there a – persistent rather than transitory –
systematic deviation of nominal exchange rates from PPP, and if yes, is this deviation
related to sectoral productivity gaps or per capita income differences? On the first ques-
tion, Froot and Rogoff (1995) argue that producer price indices lend more support to
PPP since they contain a higher proportion of tradable goods than consumer price indi-
ces. This has recently been confirmed in Coakley et al. (2005).
According to the recent overview by Bahmani-Oskooee and Nasir (2005), the empiri-
cal support for the productivity bias hypothesis is mixed and depends mainly on the
technique and the nature of the data employed. Time series and panel data approaches
have lately provided more support to the hypothesis than earlier cross-sectional studies.
In addition, most recent studies “have included other factors in their model in addition
to productivity differentials” (p. 692).
The BS literature on transition countries has, with the notable exception of de Broeck
and Sløk (2006), so far been mostly confined to identifying BS-effects within this coun-
try group’s data, without putting them into an international perspective. Early results in
this vein had been used as a basis for arguing that real appreciation  in the region is to a
large extent due to BS. Dobrinsky (2003) confirms results by Halpern and Wyplosz
(2001) and “suggests roughly a one-to-one proportion between the differential in pro-
ductivity growth and the consumer price-based real exchange rate appreciation in the
second half of the 1990s” (p. 329).Balassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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However, Égert and Halpern (2005) in their meta-regression analysis of studies on
CEEC real exchange rate behaviour fail to find a significant influence of a simple BS-
driven behaviour on real exchange rate developments in the region, i.e., there seems
more at work than BS. Recent work has supported this on the ground that PPP does not
necessarily hold even for tradables, e.g. due a quality adjustment bias, referred to in
Cincibuch and Podbiera (2004). This seems to imply that BS does perhaps not add that
much to inflation differences vis-à-vis the euro area for many countries in the region
such that specifically BS will not eventually collide with the Maastricht conditions con-
cerning the new EU member states’ readiness to join EMU.
Summing up the issue, Égert et al. (2004) stress three stylised facts of real exchange
rate behaviour in transition:
1.  until around the mid-nineties, real exchange rates in transition countries were sub-
stantially undervalued in terms of PPP;
2.  although different in extent across countries, the region has witnessed strong appre-
ciation from the outset of transition.
3.  different from the BS pattern of explanation, all types of goods, not only non-
tradable services, were or still are undervalued in terms of PPP.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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3 Comparative prices and per capita incomes: evidence from
PWT data
3.1 Comparative prices and real effective exchange rates
The Penn World Table (PWT) price and income data used in this paper are derived from
the International Comparison Project  (ICP),
3 which is about establishing purchasing
power parities over goods and services, combinations of goods and services, and finally
over GDPs. This in turn enables one to find deviations between purchasing power parities
and nominal exchange rates, i.e. comparative price levels in PWT terminology or ex-
change rate gaps in much of the literature. With only two countries, the comparative price
level is identical to the definition of a real exchange rate in section 2. However, any at-
tempt to measure deviations between purchasing power parities and nominal exchange
rates between a country and a group of other countries or even the rest of the world neces-
sarily involves a weighting scheme, and there are many weighting schemes conceivable.
Each country’s PWT comparative price level, pj, is by construction a weighted real ex-
change rate against the international dollar, where the weighting scheme is based on the
relative prices that underlie the derivation of the international dollar (see Appendix B).
The most popular measure for a country’s weighted real exchange rate in a multilat-
eral world is the trade-weighted real effective exchange rate index, reerj, which is a
weighted sum of each country’s bilateral nominal exchange rates deflated by consumer
price indices with weights corresponding to the relative importance of partner countries
in trade. The IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) provide series for a number
of countries on this measure, usually starting with 1975, in form of country-specific in-
dices which – in contrast to comparative price levels – cannot be compared in levels
across countries in an economically meaningful way.
In order to compare both measures over the period we are most interested in, we per-
form a simple OLS regressing yearly changes of all available IFS reerj data for the dec-
ade between 1990 and 2000 on yearly changes of PWT pj. The estimated slope coeffi-
cient of 0.40 is significant at the 1 per cent level, the intercept is insignificant at the 10
per cent level (R
2 = 0.29; sample size = 864 observations between 1990 and 2000).
Specifying country and/or period fixed effects does not qualify the results. Increasing
the time horizon and thus eliminating nominal disturbances even strengthens the link
between the two measures: the slope coefficient from an OLS regressing non-
overlapping five-(ten-)year changes of all available IFS reerj data for the decade be-
tween 1990 and 2000 on five-(ten-)year changes of pj is 0.71 (0.93).
This supports the view that the differently constructed reerj and pj are well correlated
measures of the deviation of a country’s multilateral exchange rate from PPP. Also, as
Figure A-1 in the appendix illustrates, differentials between rates of change of the two
                                                
3 Descriptions of the ICP and of the PWT dataset derived from the ICP can be found in Summers and
Heston (1991), Heston and Summers (1996) and the PWT site at
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.phpBalassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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measures are not systematically related to PPP-adjusted income per capita, yj. This is
important, as in what follows we are mainly interested in the relationship between pj and
yj. However, the comparative price level has the enormous advantages of being more
widely available and being internationally comparable in level terms, which is why we
use this real exchange rate measure in the rest of the paper.
3.2 The price-income benchmark relationship
Figure 1 gives a very rough account of the relationship between comparative price levels
and PPP-adjusted per capita incomes in indiscriminately using all available PWT data
between
Figure 1:  Comparative prices, pj, versus PPP-adjusted income per capita, yj,














Notes: Both yj  and pj are relative to the U.S., i.e., yUS = 100 and pUS = 100. Data are from Heston, Summers and Aten,
Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania, October 2002.
Sample size: 5,847 observations between 1950 and 2000.
1950 and 2000. While this simple scatter plot does not seem to contradict the exis-
tence of a log-linear relationship between comparative price levels and per capita in-
comes to hold universally, a more detailed inspection of the panel data along both their
time and cross-section dimensions suggests questioning this universality.
In terms of the time dimension of the data, Bergin et al. (2004), examining post-war
data in detail and finding evidence even going back for centuries, conclude that “the
price-income correlation was not really very strong until the last three or four decades”
(p. 1; see also Figure 2 below). They perform simple cross-section OLS on PWT data,
specified as,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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ln pj = 0 + 1 ln yj + j ,( 5 )
where both pj and yj are relative to U.S. levels (see Appendix B for details of construct-
ing PWT data). As (5) is in logs, the estimated slope coefficient, 1, can be interpreted
as the elasticity of the comparative price level with respect to per capita income, in
short, the price-income elasticity. Bergin et al. (2004) conclude that “in a sequence of
PWT cross sections every 5 years from 1950 to 1995, the BS effect has gradually
strengthened, with the slope estimate roughly quadrupling in size over half a century”
(p. 4). Interestingly, the null hypothesis of a zero slope can be rejected only since the
early 1960s, which is when Balassa and Samuelson wrote their seminal papers.
Figure 2:  Comparative prices versus PPP-adjusted income per capita
at various points in time
Notes: N refers to the umber of countries in respective samples. Note the difference in scale to Figure 1: here, yUS = 1
and pUS = 1. Most countries have incomes and price levels lower than the United States, so the ratios are less than one
and the logs are negative.
Source: Bergin et al. (2004) as presented in Taylor and Taylor (2004).
Why the BS-effect has altered over time remains a question of active research. Ac-
cording to one straightforward explanation (see equation 4) the non-tradable share in
income has increased over time: after all, if (5) were to directly test the hypothesis (4),
1 should correspond to an estimator of the consumption expenditure share for non-
tradables, 1–. However, neither does such an effect seem to have enough magnitude to
match the changes that have occurred, nor does it meet the timing of the changes: in
fact, in 1950 traded shares of output were lower both than in 1913 or in 2000 (TaylorBalassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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and Taylor, 2004).
4 In consequence, either (5) is simply misspecified – or the BS-effect
does not hold always and everywhere.
While the correlation described in (5) seems indeed present in today’s data, a closer
look at the cross-section dimension of the p-y relationship is also revealing. Maeso-
Fernandez et al. (2005) report that price-income elasticity estimates from cross-section
regression analyses vary greatly depending on sample composition. “(T)he inclusion of
poor countries – particularly, African countries – tends to generate lower elasticities” (p.
139). Summers and Heston (1991, p. 336) express on the p-y relationship for 1980 data
that “the distinct heteroskedasticity apparent in the graph is not properly taken into ac-
count by the log-linear functional form that was used.” However, Figure A-2 in the ap-
pendix suggests that the residuals from a log-linear cross-country regression such as (5)
exhibit serial correlation rather than heteroskedasticity when observations are in in-
creasing order of yj, This becomes especially visible when inspected in y-p (rather than
in ln y - ln p) space, as is done in the right-hand panel of Figure A-2a. This evidence
suggests different strengths of the p-y relationship in sub-samples of countries at each
point in time. However, when attempting to divide the sample one has to keep in mind
that homogenous sub-samples – in term of income intervals – need not be identical for
each year of observation. With this in mind, we formulate a simple variation of (5) that
corrects for the correlation of residuals from (5) with yj,
ln pj = 0 + 1•ln yj + 2•OECD•ln yj + j ,  ( 6 )
where again pj and yj are relative to U.S. levels and OECD = 1 for OECD member
countries.
5
We now perform simple OLS cross-section regressions based on (6) with PWT data
for each year between 1991 and 2000, where Figures A-3a and b illustrate that the speci-
fication in (6) is not plagued by heteroskedasticity or serial correlation when observa-
tions are in ascending order of yj. Table 1 shows the result of the year 2000 regression.
Especially, the elasticity of the price level with respect to PPP-adjusted per capita in-
come now appears significantly higher for OECD countries than for others, a result in
line with our earlier observation that the residuals from the basic log-linear cross-
country regression (5) are correlated with income per capita.
                                                
4 Recent approaches to endogenise BS-effects (see especially Bergin et al., 2004) start out with the hy-
pothesis that trade costs determine tradability.
5 A “1” is assigned in case of full-year membership except for CEEC countries that joined the organisation
during the 1990s, i.e. the Czech Republic in 1995, Hungary and Poland in 1996, and Slovakia in 2000.
These four countries are consistently treated as non-OECD. For a full country list, see Table A-1 in the
appendix.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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Table 1:  OLS results for equation (6), 2000
Dependent variable: ln pj
Explanatory variable Coefficient t-statistic P-value
Constant 2.77 26.34 0.00
ln yj 0.28 6.80 0.00
OECD•ln yj 0.13 4.70 0.00
Adjusted R
2: 0.56
Sample: 135 PWT countriesBalassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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4 Transition countries in the cross-section price-income rela-
tionship
Our next step consists of  a “fishing expedition” à la Suhrcke (2001), i.e., our approach
of putting transition countries’ comparative prices in an international perspective differs
from de Broeck and Sløk (2006): while they estimate a p-y relationship without transi-
tion economies and confront this benchmark with the developments of comparative
prices in transition economies, we explicitly include transition economies in the sample
to estimate ten cross-section regressions of equation (6) for each year between 1991 and
2000. We then inspect the distribution of the residuals from each of the ten regressions
and identify outlier countries from the upper and lower 5 (10) per cent of these distribu-
tions.
At the very lower end of these distributions one should find countries with compara-
tive price levels significantly lower than suggested by their PPP-adjusted per capita in-
come. As Table A-2 shows, the lowest percentile of this relationship is between 1991
and 2000 almost exclusively made up of transition economies, which in our sample (see
Table A-1) consist of the CEEC, the CIS, China, and Vietnam. Of the altogether 71 observations
in the lowest 5 per cent of the distributions of the residuals from the ten regressions of
equation (6) for the period 1991–2000, only 4 are non-transition economies (Nepal in
1991, Indonesia, Mauritius and Zimbabwe in 1998). Out of the 17 transition economies,
which we have data for in 1992 (15 CEEC and the former CIS plus China and Vietnam),
11 are present in the group of 14 countries constituting the lowest 10 per cent of the
residual distribution from the 1992 regression of equation (6). Almost needless to say,
Table A-2 confirms that no transition economy features among the upper outliers of
these distributions any time between 1991 and 2000.
To conclude, at least until the mid-1990s it is possible to isolate transition economies
without any prior knowledge as the ones “below” the international benchmark relation-
ship between comparative prices and per capita income. In 2000, this is no longer true
for the CEEC but still for the CIS economies (see Table A-2): all the ten CIS economies
we have data for in 2000 are in the lower 10 per cent of the residual distribution from
the 2000 regression of equation (6). But why are transition economies so special in the
price-income relationship? Potential answers might include:
•  incomplete price liberalisation: the output of a formerly centrally planned econ-
omy (CPE) is not yet fully priced on the market, subsidisation drives a wedge
between prices and costs. This holds especially for services, i.e., non-tradables.
•  Output quality is systematically lower in a CPE than in a market economy
(Frensch, 2004), and this may cet. par. bias comparative price levels downwards
for a CPE; in fact, this refers to potential measurement problems in the ICP.
•  A part of stabilisation packages, most transition economies devalued their nomi-
nal exchange rates considerably in the early nineties, well below PPP rates.
Obviously, the first two issues above are immediately associated with reform effort
during transition. It is therefore interesting to note that, as Figure 3 suggests, reform￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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effort during transition is related to the size of the residual from equation (6), i.e., the
more successful a transition country has been in terms of policy reform, the more it con-
forms to the world-wide benchmark relationship between comparative prices and per
capita income. Notably, this link between reform effort and distance to the benchmark
relationship between comparative prices and per capita income becomes stronger over
time.
Figure 3:  Standardised residuals from equation (6) versus reform














































Notes: Ref1 is the EBRD aggregate first phase reforms index on liberalisation and privatisation.
Figure 4 illustrates the “comparative statics” of transition countries’ distance to the
world-wide benchmark relationship between comparative prices and per capita income
in terms of the size of the residuals from equation (6) for the ten cross-section regres-
sions between 1991 and 2000. The difference between country groups is evident: CEEC
countries either appreciated in real terms to overcome an initial significant undervalua-
tion or where never significantly outside the benchmark relationship to begin with (Slo-
venia, Hungary and Poland). CIS countries, on the other hand, either did not show sig-
nificant real appreciation or when they did (Armenia and Azerbaijan) this was not suffi-
cient to render the distance to the world-wide benchmark relationship between com-
parative prices and per capita income insignificant. Summing up the evidence so far:
•  real exchange rates in transition countries at the beginning of the nineties were not
just substantially undervalued in terms of PPP but these countries formed a group
significantly  below  the world-wide benchmark relationship between comparative
prices and per capita income (see also de Broeck and Sløk, 2006);
•  at the end of the decade, this is no longer true for CEEC economies but still for the
CIS;
•  individual country progress in terms of overcoming the distance to the p-y bench-
mark relationship appears to be related to reform effort.
We know that transition reforms had both direct effects on comparative prices, via
initial liberalisation and further price deregulation, and indirect ones via productivity
enhancing reforms. Thus, simple regressions such as (6) between real appreciation andBalassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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productivity growth during transition may be spurious, as both are due to reform efforts
at least in part. We will return to this question in more detail in section 5.2.
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5 Comparative price changes and per capita income growth
5.1 The simple BS view
The simplest dynamic version of a BS-based price-income relationship is equation (6) in
growth terms over periods, i.e.,
ln p￿￿￿￿￿ – ln pjt01•(ln y￿￿￿￿￿ – ln yjt2•OECD•(ln y￿￿￿￿￿ – ln yjt) + jt .      (7)
Again both p and y are relative to U.S. levels. In estimating (7), we will, differently
from the previous section, make us of the panel characteristics of our data. As our inter-
est is mainly in transition economies, we estimate (7) over three four-year periods,
1988–92, 1992–96 and 1996–2000 with panel least squares, period fixed effects and
White period-robust coefficient variance estimation to accommodate for arbitrary serial
correlation and time-varying variances in the disturbances.
Table 2:  Panel least squares results for eqation (7), 1988–2000
Dependent variable: ln pj,t+4 – ln pjt







ln yj,t+4 – ln yjt 0.02
(0.23)
OECD•(ln yj,t+4 – ln yjt) 0.78
***
(2.76)
ln rgdpj,t+4 – ln rgdpjt 0.26
*
(1.75)





Notes: rgdp is an index of real GDP in local currency units, sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indica-
tors 2005; here, ln rgdpj,t+4 – ln rgdpjt is relative to the U.S. Estimation over three four-year periods, 1988–92, 1992–96
and 1996–2000 uses panel least squares with period fixed effects and White period standard errors and covariance; t-
statistics in parentheses. * , (**),
  (***)
 indicates significance at the 10, (5), (1) per cent level.
Column (1) in Table 2 reveals that there is no general support for a simple dynamic
p-y-relationship during the 1990s, except for OECD countries if per capita income isBalassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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measured in current year PPP-adjusted international prices.
6  One explanation for the
poor explanatory power of equation (7), as opposed to the static version in (6), might be
seen in too much nominal disturbance, which weighs more on rates of change than on
level data.
Another explanation for this result, however, may be found in the way internationally
comparable income data are constructed (see Appendix B). The essence of the discus-
sion there is that growth rates derived from PWT do differ from those derived from na-
tional SNAs and that the recommendation is to use PPP-adjusted per capita income level
data from PWT and real growth data from national accounts. Applying this to estimating
(7) gives rise to the results reproduced in column (2) of Table 2: based on constant price
data from national SNAs, there is general support for the existence of a dynamic p-y
relationship during the 1990s  – and even in the same order of magnitude as in the static
version (see Table 1) – but not for a distinct relationship for OECD countries.
Figure A-4 in the appendix reproduces the standardised residuals from this estimation
for transition countries’ real appreciation.  For 15 out of 23 transition countries in Figure
A-4 we have data on more than one four-year interval. In addition to the strong appre-
ciation during the early nineties already noticed in section 4, the majority of these cases
features a pattern of normalisation of the behaviour of residuals: a “significant over-
shooting” in the early nineties is followed by a deviation of less than one standard de-
viation from the dynamic benchmark relationship later in the decade.
5.2 An extended view
5.2.1 Equilibrium forces versus adjustment to equilibrium
So far we have relied on a simple BS-based price-income relationship with productivity
as the only determinant of the real exchange rate, as stated in equation (4). The next
logical step must consist of increasing the explanatory power of the approach by incor-
porating other sources that contribute to explaining transition and non-transition coun-
tries’ real exchange rate behaviour. In fact, this is very much in line with other recent
approaches. E.g., de Broeck and Sløk (2006) provide evidence that CEEC countries’
real exchange rate appreciation during the early transition phase can be well explained
in an international perspective within a behavioural equilibrium exchange rate approach.
Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2005) notice that many empirical approaches do not describe
the transition process properly, where transition means adjustment to rather than fluctu-
ating around a long-run equilibrium relationship. Ignoring this difference may imply
many pitfalls. To avoid those, Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2005) offer two rules to be fol-
lowed, one general, and one transition-specific. In general they require: “Following the
                                                
6 There is no qualitative change to this result when applying constant price measures of PPP-adjusted per
capita income. To obtain such measures, see the PWT site at
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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Balassa–Samuelson arguments, a higher level of productivity in industrialised countries
relative to developing economies (proxied by GDP per capita) should be reflected in
higher prices for nontraded goods relative to traded goods. In addition, demand-side
factors – possibly related to non-homothetic preferences in the demand for nontraded
services with luxury goods characteristics – as well as price regulation and tax policies
are likely to influence the relative price of non-traded and traded goods in an economy”
(p. 138). More specifically transition-related, they recommend always placing real ex-
change rate development of transition economies in an international context. We argue
that both requirements together are not met so far in the literature.
The previous sections have clearly shown that transition economies were not part of
the simple cross-section p-y relationship in the early nineties; by the end of the decade,
CEEC-countries have become part of this relationship. Therefore, when estimating a
two-variable p-y regression exclusively within the CEEC country group over the decade,
and especially when adding the time-series dimension, the estimated price-income elas-
ticity must necessarily be higher than that found for the benchmark relationship. How-
ever, even multi-variable approaches indicate that price-income elasticities in transition
economies are either very high or explicitly higher than elsewhere. Following Dobrinsky
(2003), the elasticity of CPI-based real exchange rate  indices with respect to productiv-
ity is about 1. De Broeck and Sløk (2006) find that price-productivity elasticities in tran-
sition economies are explicitly higher than in OECD economies. Against the back-
ground of the discussion in section 3, this must come as a major surprise: if anything,
price-income elasticities are higher for high income than for low income countries.
Given that reform is what differentiates transition countries, one would suspect that
this phenomenon must have something to do with reform effort. In fact, de Brock and
Sløk (2006) relate their result to reform efforts spurring productivity gains. This, of
course, cannot be a sufficient explanation: whatever the effect of reforms on output or
growth may be, why is the price-income elasticity so high in transition economies? In
our view, as already indicated in Figure 3 above, high CEEC p-y elasticity coefficients
in the literature signal an adjustment to the benchmark relationship between compara-
tive prices and per capita income due to transition reforms, as transition reforms have –
over and above indirect effects on comparative prices via productivity gains – also direct
effects on comparative prices via initial price liberalisation and subsequent deregulation.
We thus maintain that high price-income elasticity estimates for CEEC countries in the
literature are upward biased due to misspecification by omitting an important explana-
tory variable: some of this elasticity should be attributed to direct reform impetus on
deregulating prices.
Our approach is therefore close in spirit to Coricelli and Jazbec (2001) in attempting
to highlight the role of reforms, especially of price deregulation, for real exchange rate
developments during transition.
7 However, we extend Coricelli and Jazbec (2001) by
putting our approach in an international context.
                                                
7 Coricelli and Jazbec (2001) relate reform to real exchange rates during transition mostly by using reform
indicators as instruments for transition induced reallocation.Balassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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5.2.2 “Real” sources of real exchange rate development during transition
and beyond
Also much like Coricelli and Jazbec (2001), in addition to price deregulation efforts we
focus on the role of real factors in this process. With Blanchard (1997) we define transi-
tion as resource reallocation, corporate restructuring, and liberalisation. In the simple
set-up of equations (3) and (4), the only alternative to a deepening productivity gap to
imply a more pronounced BS-type relationship was by a rise in the share of non-traded
goods in GDP, which seems heavily at odds with recent empirical developments. The
extended argument in Frensch (2005), on which we build here, however, allows to sepa-
rate tradability from reallocation in terms of changes in income shares spent on services
and industrial goods (see also Frensch, 2000). For further analysis, we return to the ar-
bitrage view of the classic BS set-up in section 2, however extending the framework to
incorporate transition. For ease of exposition, we change to logarithmic notation and
omit time for the moment. Then following the notation in section 2,
12 1 2 21 ln ln ln ln e P P RER − − = .( 8 )
Rather than differentiating only between tradables and non-tradables, we assume
economies to have two sectors, industry (I) and services (S), with products entering na-




j j j P P P ln ) 1 ( ln ln φ φ − + = .      (9)
We make a few simplifying but well-grounded assumptions to modify the set-up of sec-
tion 2:
(A1) While all services are non-tradable, only some part of industrial goods, j τ , is trad-
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j A w P ln ln ln − + = λ ,    (11)
where h = S; I,T; I,NT, w is the wage rate and A is labour productivity, which is the sa-
me in all of industry.
(A3) Exposure to international trade increases the intensity of competition, i.e.,
T I T NT NT I S , , λ λ λ λ λ = > = = .    (12)
(A4) Purchasing power parity, as usually, does not hold for non-tradables; for tradables,
PPP is restricted by quality differentials according to￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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where country 2 product quality of tradables, 
T I ,
21 κ , is defined relative to country 1.
From equations (8) and (13),
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where (9) implies that
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From (15) and (16),
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j j P P P P − − + − − = τ φ φ .    (18)
Substituting for prices according to (11) and collecting terms yields








j j A A P P λ λ φ τ φ − − + − − = − .    (19)
Then, equation (14) implies,
). )( ( )] ln )(ln 1 ( ) ln )(ln 1 [( ln 2 2 1 1
,
21 1 1 1 2 2 2 21
T NT T I S I S I A A A aA RER λ λ φ τ φ τ κ φ φ − − + + − − − − − =
(20)Balassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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After total differentiation and again collecting terms, we decompose the rate of change











= ∆ 21 lnRER       (21)
    ) ln ln )( 1 ( ) ln ln )( 1 ( 1 1 1 2 2 2
S I S I A A A A ∆ − ∆ − − ∆ − ∆ − φ φ
(a) Productivity gap between industry and services
T I,
21 κ ∆ +  (b) Quality improvement of tradables
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ]
T NT S I T NT S I A A A A λ λ τ φ λ λ τ φ − + − ∆ − − + − ∆ + 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 ln ln ln ln
 (b) Sectoral reallocation between industry and services
() ( )
T NT λ λ τ φ τ φ − ∆ − ∆ + 2 2 1 1 .           (d) Trade liberalisation
Compared to section 2, the slight twist in sectoral decomposition, by adding eco-
nomic activity categories to the tradable-non-tradable dichotomy, is quite fruitful: re-
member that in the simple set-up, the only alternative to BS for P2/P1 to increase was by
a rise in the share of non-traded goods in GDP, which seems heavily at odds with em-
pirical developments. The argument here, however, allows to separate tradability from
income shares spent on services and industrial goods. This allows to show that, in addi-
tion to the productivity gap effect, reallocation from industry towards services in country
2, relative to country 1 ( 0   2 < ∆φ ), also implies a real exchange rate appreciation as-





	2 > 0 and
1 = 0) implies a real depreciation for country 2. Symmetric reduction in barriers to
	
12 > 0) implies a depreciation for country 2 as long as the share of this
country’s services sector in total production is smaller than in country 1. While all of
these three phenomena are supposed to be specifically pronounced during transition, in
fact they occur elsewhere and at other times as well, allowing us to study real exchange
rates of non-transition countries within the same framework.
5.2.3 Data and measurement
Price deregulation is a continuous process during transition, goes well beyond the initial
price liberalisation, and also includes reform efforts that have price deregulation impli-
cations, such as privatisation. In  terms of measuring price deregulation, the EBRD av-
erage indicator of stage 1 reforms, i.e., the liberalisation plus privatisation index (Ref1)
therefore seems appropriate. For non-transition economies, we state that during the 1990s￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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there was no reform effort comparable in order of magnitude to what happened at the
same time in transition economies.
We measure reallocation by the change in the nominal GDP share of services, drawn
from the World Bank’s WDI 2005. Regrettably, we do not have an appropriate inde-
pendent measure for quality improvement, so that corporate restructuring and ensuing
quality improvements affects per capita income over and above productivity growth.
Given the notorious difficulties in measuring barriers to trade, we proxy trade liberali-
sation by the result, i.e., by the change in a country’s openness to trade over the period
under consideration, as measured by the PPP-adjusted GDP share of total trade provided
in the PWT dataset.
Country coverage is driven by the aim of the exercise, i.e., putting CEEC real ex-
change rate behaviour in an international perspective. In order to reduce country hetero-
geneity in the following panel approach, we include only economies with 10 < yj < 110,
with yUS = 100; for the composition of CEEC country group data, this has the slight con-
sequence that Albania is part of the panel with only 3 rather than with all 6 observations
available during the 1990s.
5.2.4 Specification and estimation results
The extensions of the simple BS set-up discussed so far give way to hypothesising our
measure of the real exchange rate as,
 ln pjt = 0 + 1•ln yjt + 2•OECD•ln yjt + 3•Servicesjt + 4•Openjt                          + jt ,   (22a)
for non-transition economies, and
 ln pjt = 5 + 6•ln yjt              + 7•Servicesjt + 8•Openjt + 9•Ref1jt + jt,    (22b)
for CEEC economies, with the a priori expectation that 1, 2, 3,6, 7,9 > 0 and 4, 8 <
0.
While the cross-section analysis of section 4 provided a first indication of the p-y re-
lationship, it ignored the time-series information in the data. In order to incorporate this
information, we need to adopt a panel data approach. We estimate equation (22) in two
specifications: in levels (logs) and in differenced logs, i.e. in yearly rates of change, both
against two unbalanced panels of countries between 1992 and 2000: the first panel con-
sists of non-transition PWT countries, the second is made up of the CEEC economies.
Choosing an appropriate panel specification for estimating (22) is crucial. The prob-
lem lies in adding a time series dimension to data on a hypothesis, which is originally a
statement on cross-sections. Both the level and the dynamic specifications may involve
potential violations of the assumptions of the classical linear regression model along
time and cross-section dimensions, which may be especially serious given our additional
constraint that the limited length of the time series prevents the use of cointegration
techniques.Balassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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In level specification, country effects might restrict the variation in the data along the
time-series dimension but if most of the variation were indeed along the cross-section
dimension, country effects might bias against finding a BS-effect. On the other hand,
“identifying the BS-effect from a time series correlation could be misleading, since
high-frequency business-cycle correlations of the real exchange rate with output fluc-
tuations (arising from quite different mechanisms) might cloud the picture” (Bergin et
al., 2004, p. 6). Under these circumstances, Bergin et al. (2004) recommend estimating
with a common intercept and a common AR(1) term for all countries, where the esti-
mate of the AR(1) parameter can then be read as the half-life of deviations from equilib-
rium real exchange rates. Accordingly, we test in levels by generalised least squares
with cross-section weights,
8 which takes into account and corrects for the presence of
cross-section heteroskedasticity, as suggested by Dobrinsky (2003), and include an auto-
regressive term.
When including a transition reform variable as an explanatory variable, level estima-
tion involves potentially serious problems of common trends and collinearity among
regressors: during transition, virtually everything is interdependent with reform effort,
and Ref1, i.e. the EBRD reform indicator in levels, obeys a time trend. We correct for
this by detrending the reform variable against a linear time trend; this detrended version
of Ref1 enters the estimation as Ref1_d, minimising both the time trend problem and
collinearity with other explanatory variables.
In the dynamic specification, auto-regressive terms do not appear feasible, a general-
ised least squares approach therefore has to stress the assumption of either cross-section
or period heteroskedasticity and correlation. As cross-sectional weighting leaves any
correlation other than contemporaneous unaddressed, we prefer period SUR weights
correcting both for period heteroskedasticity and general correlation of observations
within any cross-section.
As the level equation is in logs, estimated coefficients can be interpreted as long-run
elasticities. Likewise, in the dynamic specification, the estimated coefficients can be
interpreted as short-run elasticities, where in both specifications our main attention is for
the price-income elasticity. We follow the previosuly introduced recommendation to use
PPP-adjusted per capita income level data from PWT and real growth data from national
accounts. Finally, in both the level and the dynamic specifications, we estimate (22b)
with and without the reform variable.
Tables 3a and b present the results of estimating (22) in level and in dynamic specifi-
cation, respectively. For the panel of non-transition economies (columns 1 and 4), dif-
ferent from earlier sections the OECD variable is no longer significant in this extended
approach in either specification. All other coefficients have the expected signs and are
significant. Very noticeably, the point estimates of the long-run and the short run price-
income elasticities in the OECD sample are the same. Level and dynamic estimates of
the coefficients of the services and openness variables are in the same order of magni-
tude.
                                                
8 The more preferred cross-section SUR approach is not feasible, as in our panel the number of cross-
sections exceeds the number of periods.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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Table 3a:  Panel EGLS estimation results for equation (22), 1992–2000, in levels
Dependent variable: ln pjt
Explanatory variable
(1) (2) (3)
Constant       2.95
***
(15.65)
    2.79
***
(8.19)
    3.29
***
(8.03)
ln yjt     0.21
***
(4.64)





OECD•ln yjt   0.001
(0.08)




















AR(1)        0.95
***
(117.17)
     0.68
***
(21.97)













Notes: p, y, Services and Open and Ref1 are all relative to the U.S. Ref1_d is the detrended version of Ref1. Estima-
tion is by panel EGLS with cross-section weights over unbalanced samples of countries with 10 < yjt < 110, 1992–2000;
t-statistics in parentheses. * , (**),
  (***)
 indicates significance at the 10, (5), (1) per cent level. CEEC countries in the
sample (columns 2, 3): see Table A-1.
Tables 3a and b present the results of estimating (22) in level and in dynamic specifi-
cation, respectively. For the panel of non-transition economies (columns 1 and 4), dif-
ferent from earlier sections the OECD variable is no longer significant in this extended
approach in either specification. All other coefficients have the expected signs and are
significant. Very noticeably, the point estimates of the long-run and the short run price-
income elasticities in the OECD sample are the same. Level and dynamic estimates of
the coefficients of the services and openness variables are in the same order of magni-
tude.Balassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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Table 3b: Panel EGLS estimation results for equation (22), 1992–2000, in yearly changes
Dependent variable : ln pjt – ln pj,t–1
Explanatory variable
(4) (5) (6)
Constant       4.24
***
(7.98)






ln rgdpjt  – ln rgdpj,t–1     0.21
***
(7.99)












      0.005
***
(4.27)






Openjt – Openj,t–1   –0.001
***
(–10.76)



















Notes: p, y, Services and Open and Ref1 are all relative to the U.S. Estimation is by panel EGLS with cross-section
weights over unbalanced samples of countries with 10 < yjt < 110, 1992–2000; t-statistics in parentheses. * , (**),
  (***)
indicates significance at the 10, (5), (1) per cent level. CEEC countries in the sample (columns 5 and 6): see Table A-1.
In the CEEC sample, reform effort is a significant variable in both the level and the
dynamic specification (columns 3 and 6). Accordingly, introducing reform effort always
implies a reduction of the point-estimates of the price-income elasticities in the CEEC
sample down to the benchmark order of magnitude in columns 1 and 4, respectively.
This is especially noteworthy in the dynamic version, where on the basis of simple
Wald-test, we can reject the hypothesis that the price-income-elasticity for transition
economies estimated in column 5 is equal to the benchmark estimate in column 4.
These results lead us to conclude that during the 1990s, when accounting for the di-
rect influence of reform effort on comparative prices, the price-income-elasticity for
transition economies is not different from non-transition economies in the same income
range. However, as indicated by the auto-regressive terms in column 3, the speed of
adjustment to equilibrium appears slower in transition economies than elsewhere.
These conclusions are based on the notion that direct reform effort is independent:
however, Campos and Coricelli (2002, p. 828) note the “issue of correlation between
initial conditions and liberalization measures. One can argue that the extent of liberali-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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zation and the speed of reform are not independent of initial conditions.” This debate is
far from over, but at least for the first decade of transition it seems that if anything it is
indeed initial conditions – rather than current or most recent economic performance over
and above that induced by initial conditions – that shape progress in reform (see Falcetti
et al., 2002 and Godoy and Stiglitz, 2006). While resolving this issue cannot be a subject
of this paper, it may perhaps not really matter whether it is initial conditions or inde-
pendent reform effort that subtract from the price-income elasticity when properly ac-
counting for either.
6 Conclusions
The paper puts real exchange rate developments of transition economies into an interna-
tional perspective. To this end, we first illustrate the special status of transition econo-
mies in the world-wide benchmark relationship between comparative prices and per
capita income: a pronounced undervaluation at the start of transition, followed by a tran-
sition-specific pattern of strong appreciation during the early nineties, results in “nor-
malisation” for CEEC economies but not for the CIS. We then make an attempt at ex-
tending the BS framework. The results of this exercise imply that, when accounting for
demand shifts, external liberalisation, and especially for reform effort, the price-income-
elasticity for CEEC economies is not different from that of non-transition economies
during the nineties.Balassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures
Figure A-1:  Growth differentials between trade weighted CPI-deflated real effective
exchange rates, reerj, and comparable price levels, pj,






































































































Notes: reerj data are from IFS, for data on pj and yj see Figure 1. Sample size: 864 observations in a), and 153 in b).
Simple OLS regressions between growth  rate differentials of both measures and yj produce insignificant slope coeffi-
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Notes: See  Appendix A, Figure A-1. Sample size: 135 (y ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
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Notes: See Appendix A, Figure A-1. 135 observations in ascending order of yj (￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correla-
tion LM Test (6 lags included) indicates serial correlation at 5 per cent level of significance. No significant White statis-
tic on heteroskedasticity.Balassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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Figure A-3a: Comparative price level versus PPP-adjusted income per capita, in logs,

















































































Notes: See Appendix A, Figure A-11. Sample size: 135 (y ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
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Notes: Residj are the residuals from ln pj = c(3) + c(4)•OECD•ln yj  for the year 2000, where OECD is a dummy variable (see text
for explanation). 135 observations in ascending order of yj (￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (6 lags
included) does not indicate serial correlation. No significant White statistic on heteroskedasticity.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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Table A-1: Country  list







All other PWT countries. For
full country composition, see











mark, Spain, Finland, France,
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Appendix B. PWT data construction and economic relation-
ships
Making aggregate quantities, such as GDPs, internationally comparable always means
comparable in a common currency. Consider there is more than one good in each econ-
omy. Expressing price ratios of goods in terms of a foreign currency then necessarily
involves the imposition of the foreign price structure when constructing any weighted
price index such as PPP over GDP. This problem, of course, has been recognised early
in the ICP so that in the course of comparing prices of international goods and weighting
them to price indices involves weighting the price structures of all the countries in the
project such that the reference currency is not the U.S. dollar but rather a virtual cur-
rency resulting from the weighting procedure, the international dollar. In this virtual
currency, “relative prices of goods are set at the ‘weighted’ average of relative prices for
the same goods in all countries and the level of prices is normalized so that the GDP of
the United States is the same in international dollars as in American dollars” (Summers
and Heston, 1991, p. 334).
However, there is of course one real world country that comes closest to the price
structure of this virtual currency. In fact, for the 1985 ICP benchmark data, this country
can be shown to have been Hungary (Nuxoll, 1994), which means that the construction
of price indices, such as the PPP over GDP, involves imposing Hungarian relative prices
everywhere in the world. Then, stemming directly from the usual index number problem
(Paassche versus Laspeyres), the Gerschenkron effect states that measured growth rates
of comparable quantities depend on the underlying relative price structure.
9 I.e., if Hun-
gary’s price structure is the relevant price structure for international comparisons, then
PPP-adjusted per capita incomes and growth rates of countries richer (poorer) than
Hungary are overstated (understated) by using Hungarian relative prices. Of course,
there is a danger that any economic relationship involving these internationally compa-
rable prices and quantities may be biased by the construction of the data, be it in the area
of convergence debates or in the BS context.
Nuxoll (1994) shows that Gerschenkron effects are indeed present in the ICP data,
which underlie the PWT, and that growth rates derived from PWT do differ from those
derived from national SNAs. However, this difference is not significantly dependent on
PPP-adjusted per capita income levels, most probably due to the high level of aggrega-
tion of PWT data (rather, the difference depends on the size of relative price changes in
the period under consideration, and this is certainly an issue for transition economies).
Still, in the context of the convergence debate, Nuxoll’s recommendation is to use per
capita income level data from PWT and growth data from national accounts. So far, an
effort to analyse the effects of potential bias from data construction on the p-y relation-
ship illustrated in Figure 1 is still missing.
                                                
9 Nuxoll (1996) gives a account of Gerschenkron’s original problem of properly measuring Soviet growth.Balassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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Balassa-Samuelson effects in the presence of product differen-
tiation and trade barriers. Implications for transition and con-
vergence
Abstract
: The paper first illustrates the simple arbitrage view of the Balassa-Samuelson effect
and its implications on the relationship between comparative prices and real per capita
income. Two aspects of this relationship are then illustrated and connected: in the con-
text of trade in differentiated goods, a higher elasticity of substitution is shown to
strengthen the BS-effect. Connecting indirect trade barriers to the elasticity of substitu-
tion, the strength of the BS-effect increases with trade liberalisation. Considering this
result in an extended arbitrage view on prices and productivities reveals that there are no
transition-specific forces left to weaken the BS-effect, when defining transition as liber-
alisation, reallocation, and restructuring. An immediate corollary is that inflation differ-
entials between Central and East European economies and the euro-area should weaken
over time. To the extent they do not, these inflation differentials increasingly signal
disequilibria, rather than equilibrium phenomena.
JEL-Classification: F40, F43
Keywords: Balassa-Samuelson, transition, product differentiation
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1.Introduction
The empirical starting point for the paper is the existence of a significant cross-country
relationship between comparative prices and real per capita income, as documented in
Bergin et al.  (2004), where “internationally comparable prices” refers to any measure of
the deviation of a country’s multilateral exchange rate from purchasing power parity
such as a real exchange rate index. At the very centre of theoretical explanations of this
observation is the “Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis” (BS) featuring divergent productiv-
ity developments across sectors of tradable versus non-tradable goods. Accepting the
validity of BS and assuming that productivity differences occur (almost) exclusively in
the tradable goods sector immediately implies the cross-country relationship between
comparative prices and real per capita income. In consequence, economic convergence
based on productivity gains centred in the tradable goods sector implies inflation differ-
entials and real exchange rate appreciation for catching up economies as equilibrium
phenomena.
This consensus view bears significant consequences, as inflationary differentials with
richer economies, as long as they are assessed to be grounded in convergence, will not
set off economic policy responses. Economic development and stability are thus vitally
dependent upon the correctness of this assessment.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the simple BS-
framework based on arbitrage equalising prices – and thus unit labour costs – of trad-
ables across countries, i.e., on incomplete trade specialisation. However, this specialisa-
tion argument remains implicit, as there is in fact no trade in this type of model. To
check the robustness of the BS result, section 3 presents a simple model of trade with
complete specialisation in differentiated tradables. This reveals a modified relationship
between prices and productivities, the strength of which varies systematically with the
strength of barriers to trade. Section 4 incorporates this insight into a more comprehen-
sive arbitrage view on prices and productivities, extended by key real factors of rele-
vance to transition economies, i.e., liberalisation, reallocation and restructuring.Balassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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2 Prices and productivities: The simple arbitrage view
In its simplest version, the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is based on a framework of
two countries, two (homogenous) goods (one tradable, X, one non-tradable, Z), and one
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The intuition  for the link between prices and productivities in equation (2) is rather
simple: wages correspond to the marginal value product of labour; with the latter rising
in the tradables sector in country 1, e.g. due to technical progress, wages there will also
increase, as tradables prices are tied by arbitrage. National labour mobility implies in-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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creasing wages also in the non-tradables sector resulting in price increases there, absent
any technical change, which correspond to the original increase in productivity in the
country’s tradables sector. In consequence, both the relative price of non-tradables in
country 1 as well as country 1’s overall price index relative to country 2 increase with
increasing labour productivity in country 1’s tradable sector, e.g.,  due to technical prog-
ress.
10
Therefore, country 1’s internationally comparable price index is higher than in coun-
try 2 if country 1’s productivity in the tradables sector, relative to the non-tradables
sector, is higher than in country 2. Assuming that productivity differences occur (al-
most) exclusively in the tradable goods sector immediately implies the cross-country
relationship between comparative prices and real per capita income, cited in the intro-
duction. In consequence, economic convergence based on productivity gains centred in
the tradable goods sector implies inflation differentials and real exchange rate apprecia-
tion for catching up economies. However, this consensus view, illustrated in equation
(2), can be criticised both on theoretical and empirical grounds:
•  Even within the simple two-countries-two-goods-one-factor framework,  different
productivity increases across countries that are, however, balanced in tradables and
non-tradables sectors do not imply cross-country inflation differentials; in case pro-
ductivity differences occur (almost) exclusively in the non-tradable goods sector,
converging economies should have even lower inflation than richer ones.
•  Deviations from the simplifying assumptions of the simple two-countries-two-
goods-one-factor set-up show the knife-edge role of these assumptions for the result
of a systematic relationship between prices and productivities (cf., e.g., Podkaminer,
2003).
•  Intuitively, much of the systematic relationship between prices and productivities
seems to hinge on the assumption of homogenous tradables, with arbitrage equating
international prices. Therefore, the following section uses a simple trade model to
inquire the behaviour of prices and productivities when tradable goods are differen-
tiated.
                                                
10 The only alternative, opened up by equation (2), for P1/P2 to increase is by a rise in the share of non-
traded goods in consumption over time; judging by trade shares of GDP, this seems heavily at odds with
empirical developments, however. In section 4 will make a new attempt at isolating demand influences on
P1/P2.Balassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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3 A monopolistic competition model of trade with
product differentiation
The trade model underlying this section is Ricardian in nature, enriched by a Chamber-
linian approach to product differentiation (cf. Venables, 1987). Again, there are two
countries, each with only one production factor (labour); both countries produce a non-
tradable good and a finite number of industrial products, which are all tradable.
3.1 Production
The production function for the non-tradable good is again linear in labour, the only
input, as in section 2,  . ) ( j
N
j j z L A Z =  Perfect competition among producers ensures that





j A w P = with again wj as the nominal wage rate in country j.
In the industrial sector, monopolistic competitors manufacture industrial products,
each of which is produced with a linear technology subject to internal economies of
scale; industrial technologies are identical within a country but may differ between
countries according to the specification used in Fitzgerald (2003),
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3.2 Demand
According to the usual formulation of consumer preferences over varieties of differenti-
ated products (e.g., Frensch, 2002), let
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where qji describes the price of an industrial good produced in country j sold in country
i, and where the nominal exchange rate is normalised to one;  σ β / 1 1− =   a n d


















Assuming equal preferences across countries with constant expenditure shares and 1–
, respectively, for  M and Z, aggregate demand for the index of industrial consumer
goods in country j is
, /
T
j j j P Y M θ =        (7)
with j j j L w Y = as total income in country j. Aggregate consumer demand in country j for
an industrial product from either country can then be derived as (see, e.g., Frensch, 2002
or Venables, 1987),
. ) (
) 1 /( ) 1 /( 1
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β β β − − =        (8)
3.3 Barriers to trade
The assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution,  ) 1 /( 1 β σ − = , between any pair
of industrial products gives rise to the possibility of linking product differentiation to the
existence of indirect barriers to trade. By our definition, the elasticity of substitution
between any pair of home-produced industrial products is assumed to be the same as
between a domestically produced and a foreign industrial product. However, there are
reasons to assume that in reality this is not so. The enormous weight of non-tariff barri-
ers to trade in industrial goods, in the form of different national technical standards,
norms etc., as compared to tariffs, can be taken as evidence that empirically the elastic-
ity of substitution between any pair of home-produced industrial products is in fact
higher than between a home-produced and a foreign industrial product, where the latter
increases towards the former in the course of a reduction in trade barriers. This implies
an increasing “ average” elasticity of substitution between any pair of industrial products
with decreasing barriers to trade.
For reasons of analytical tractability, in what follows we have to uphold the assump-
tion of a constant elasticity of substitution. However, in line with the reasoning above,
we will identify decreasing indirect barriers to trade with an increasing elasticity of sub-
stitution, , between any pair of industrial products, and thus with a rising .Balassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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3.4 International equilibrium
Short-run equilibrium is defined by goods and factor markets clearing in both countries
as well as balanced trade; a long-run equilibrium meets the additional condition that the
monopolistically competitive producers make zero profits; our interest will be only in
long-run equilibria.
Each monopolistic competitor specialises on exactly one variant of industrial goods
and the short-run equilibrium condition, marginal revenue = marginal cost, holds for
each producer on each market. Assuming a large number of industrial producers, each
one’s own price elasticity on each market is equal to  ) 1 /( 1 β − . His marginal revenue on
each market is accordingly ji ji q x R M β = ) ( ; absent direct barriers to trade, and with the
nominal exchange rate normalised to one, prices of domestically produced industrial
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Profits of the representative component producer in country j are thus
. ) ( j j ji jj j j l w x x q − + = π   The cost function (4) and (9) imply
. / ) ( ) 1 ( a b w X X q j j ji jj j j − + − = β π
Total value of industrial production in country j is ) ( ji jj j j j X X q n R + = . With (9),
.

















     (10)
Total (value of) demand for industrial products in country  j is  ij i i jj j j j X q n X q n Y + = θ ;
trade balance requires  ij i i ji j j X q n X q n = . Therefore,  j j j j R L w Y = =θ θ .
In the long-run, profits are eliminated by free market access and  j j j R L w = θ implies via
(9),
, ) 1 (
b
a
L n j j θ β − =      (11)
illustrating that with internal returns to scale the division of labour is limited by the ex-
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3.5 Prices and productivities with trade in differentiated goods
For deriving an internationally comparable consumer price index relation in the frame-
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Absent direct trade barriers, and according to equation (6), 
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T T P P 2 1 = , this can be extended to give an internationally comparable consumer
price index relation in the framework of (1), with product differentiation in the absence
of trade barriers,
11
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Comparing equation (14) to equation (2), i.e. to the classic BS-hypothesis without prod-
uct differentiation, reveals two important differences.
First, complete specialisation and the presence of market power due to product dif-
ferentiation imply a terms-of-trade effect that is absent in the classic BS set-up with ho-
mogenous goods. In consequence, this terms-of-trade effect might weaken the BS-effect
even to the extent of a negative relationship between aggregate productivity ratios and
relative prices. To illustrate this, again consider the case of equal productivity in the
tradables and the non-tradables sectors of each country such that, according to equation








Now assume that in equation (14) productivities in both countries’ non-tradable sec-
tors are constant and equal. Then, the elasticity of relative prices with respect to the pro-
ductivities ratio in the tradable sectors equals (1–). I.e., the higher , i.e., the higher
the elasticity of substitution between any pair of industrial products, the smaller the
terms-of-trade effect and the closer equation (14) comes to the original classic BS set-up
with homogenous goods. Thus, the higher , the stronger the BS-effect in the context of
differentiated goods. Identifying decreasing indirect barriers to trade with an increasing
, we can conclude that the lower the barriers to trade, the stronger the BS-effect in the
context of differentiated goods. Relating barriers to trade to trade liberalisation, we may
finally conclude that the strength of the BS-effect in the context of differentiated goods
increases with trade liberalisation.
Obviously, this result fits in quite well with the empirical observation that a strong,
systematic relationship between prices and productivities, as postulated in BS, has been
only a relatively recent one, while it was practically unobservable until the mid-forties
of the twentieth century (Bergin et al., 2004) when a substantial decline in trade barriers
to international trade started to set in.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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4 Prices and productivities: An extended arbitrage
view for transition economies
The theoretical caveats at the end of section 2 as well as the results of section 3 should
caution one to accept the existence of a strong, BS-based systematic relationship be-
tween prices and productivities as some kind of law of nature. For further analysis, we
return to the arbitrage view of the classic BS set-up, however, extending the framework
to incorporate the result of the previous section and the effects of transition. In the spirit
of Blanchard (1997), we define transition as (trade) liberalisation, (resource) realloca-
tion and (corporate) restructuring, and  investigate whether there are transition-specific
reasons to strengthen or weaken the BS-effect.
Following the definition in equation (1) of an internationally comparable consumer price
index relation,
2 1 2 1 ln ln P P p p − = − = Π ,                          (15)
with small fonts indicating logarithmic values. Rather than differentiating only between
tradables and non-tradables, now we assume economies to have two sectors, industry (I)
and services (S), with products entering national price levels with potentially different
weights such that,
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In order to derive conclusions on transition-specific versus general BS-effects on the
development of internationally comparable consumer price indices, we make a few sim-
plifying, but nevertheless well-grounded assumptions to modify the simple two-
countries-two goods-one factor of production set-up of section 2.
(A1)  While all services are non-tradable, only part of industrial goods are tradable due
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(A3)  Exposure to international trade increases the intensity of competition, i.e.,
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tivity, ln  = (a1 – a2).
(A5) Purchasing power parity, as usually, does not hold for non-tradables; for trad-
ables, PPP is restricted by quality differentials according to 
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Definitions (15) and (16), together with (A5), imply long-run internationally compa-
rable consumer price indices according to,
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where equation (16) implies that
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Inserting from (A1) results in
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Substituting for prices according to (A2) and collecting terms yields








j j a a p p − − + − − = − φ λ λ φ τ ,
implying
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After total differentiation and again collecting terms, we may finally decompose the












value indicates a growth rate),
  = ∆Π            (19)
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) ( 2 1 a a ∆ − ∆ +γ   (b) quality improvement due to restructuring
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ]
T NT S I T NT S I a a a a λ λ τ φ λ λ τ φ − + − ∆ − − + − ∆ + 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2     (c) sectoral reallocation
() ( )
T NT λ λ τ φ τ φ − ∆ − ∆ + 1 1 2 2 .   (d) trade liberalisation
Referring to (a) as “Balassa-Samuelson,” may appear a bit sloppy, as it is differential
increases in productivities between industry and services that drives international price
differentials here, rather than between tradables and non-tradables. However, we want to
refer to the general notion of sectoral productivity differentials as BS effect, which, as
usual, also in this framework implies an increasing domestic (i.e., country 1 relative to
country 2) internationally comparable consumer price index (e.g., a real appreciation in
case prices are made comparable by market exchange rates). Compared to section 2, the
slight twist in sectoral decomposition, by adding economic activity categories to the
tradable-non-tradable dichotomy, is quite fruitful: it allows us to show that reallocation
from domestic industry towards services ( 0   1 < ∆φ ) cet. par. also implies an increasing
domestic relative price index, as long as productivity in domestic industry is higher than
in domestic services.
Remember from the argument in section 2, that in the simple set-up there, the only
alternative to BS for P1/P2 to increase was by a rise in the share of non-traded goods in
GDP, which seems heavily at odds with empirical developments. The argument here,
however, allows to separate tradability from income shares spent on services and indus-
trial goods. In fact, referring to the experience of transition economies, it seems well
documented that both effects, sectoral productivity differentials and an increasing share
of services in income, were relevant forces especially during the early stages of transi-
tion,
12 while for later stages of transition as well as for the experience of non-transition
economies in general this seems less certain.
In the much richer context here, equation (19) also illustrates that in addition to dif-
ferential productivity growth and reallocation, corporate restructuring during transition
and convergence and the ensuing quality improvements in domestically produced trad-
able industrial goods also imply an increasing domestic relative price index.
13
The argument so far leaves us only trade liberalisation as a potential transition-







0) implies a decreasing domestic relative price index. Symmetric reduction in barriers to
	
 1"2 > 0) implies a decreasing domestic relative price index as long as the
share of the services sector in total production is larger abroad than domestically, which
is certainly relevant in early stage of transition.
                                                
12 For a documentation of the former effect, see Halpern and Wyplosz (2001), for the latter, cf. Frensch
(2000).
13 For a theoretical motivation, see Frensch (2004).Balassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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However, the results of section 3 illustrated that trade liberalisation, in the sense of
reducing trade barriers, has a positive effect on the strength of the BS-effect in the con-
text of differentiated goods. While it is not possible to explicitly build this result into the
arbitrage decomposition analysis of this section, we can still take this result to consid-
erably weaken the argument stated above on trade liberalisation as a potential transition-
specific force against real appreciation.
Thus taking the discussion of section 3 into consideration, the extended arbitrage
view of this section illustrates that in fact there are transition-specific reasons to
strengthen the BS-effect such that there is a specific inflation differential between  tran-
sition economies and non-transition economies. Also, due to the nature of  transition
specifities analysed in this section, we may conclude that this transition-specific infla-
tion differential is higher in earlier than in later stages of transition.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Working Paper Nr. 266
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5 Some conclusions
This paper illustrates and connects two aspects of the relationship between internation-
ally comparable prices and productivities, based on the BS effect: in the context of trade
in differentiated goods, a higher elasticity of substitution is shown to strengthen the BS-
effect. Identifying decreasing indirect barriers to trade with an increasing elasticity of
substitution, we conclude that the strength of the BS-effect in the context of differenti-
ated goods increases with trade liberalisation. Considering this result in an extended
arbitrage view on prices and productivities, we show that there are in fact no transition-
specific forces to weaken the BS-effect, when defining transition as (trade) liberalisa-
tion, (resource) reallocation and (corporate) restructuring.
While this implies that transition-specific inflation differentials are higher in earlier
than in later stages of transition,  an immediate policy-relevant corollary of this is that
inflation differentials between Central and East European economies and the euro-area
should weaken over time with transition effects fading out. To the extent that inflation
differentials persist, they increasingly signal disequilibria, rather than equilibrium phe-
nomena connected with economic transition and convergence, calling for stabilisation
efforts.Balassa-Samuelson, Product Differentiation and Transition
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